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Abstract
The present work reassesses the impact of good governance and democracy on Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) in oil-abundant countries. To this end, we estimate the effect of host
countries’ institutions on greenfield FDI, using a gravity equation for a dataset that covers
182 countries during 2003-2012. Our findings confirm that compliance to rule of law, lack of
corruption, political stability and democracy could boost new FDI links through the extensive
margin. Our results could not rule out the “oil curse”, meaning that oil producers attract
fewer new greenfield projects than similar countries without oil. Unlike other studies, we
show that the impact of institutions is not necessarily undermined by the presence of natural
resources.
Introduction
Recent decades have witnessed ups and downs in oil prices, provoking economic and social
instability in oil-abundant countries, serving as a reminder of how important it might be to
diversify their economies. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) could improve these countries’
development as it can bring new technologies, broaden access to new markets through exports,
and diversify economic activity. According to [1], FDI is one of the main pillars of develop-
ment strategies in resource-rich countries as it can also help natural-resource-based activities
to foster growth through new skills and technologies.
Natural resources can be broadly divided into two main categories; point and diffuse
sources. Examples of the former are oil and minerals. These types of resources are character-
ized by their specific localization, and ownership of production and revenues are concentrated
among few agents. Alternatively, agriculture or forestry are more likely to be more dispersed
through the economy. Abundance in point-source natural resources is extensively associated
with countries’ low economic performance [2, 3]. The natural-resource curse entails low eco-
nomic growth through lack of trade of manufactured goods, low institutional quality charac-
terized by predatory institutions and undesirable allocation of resources in favour of rent
seeking and in detriment of human capital formation or investment in productive activities
(e.g. [4–7]). Successfully managing resource wealth is an economic and political process that
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requires private investment and judicious policies to hedge adverse impacts [8]. Research has
identified both a positive e.g. [9, 10] and a negative e.g. [11, 12] relationship between FDI &
natural-resource endowments.
Each natural resource is exposed to different price fluctuations and entails different extrac-
tive costs and technology and as a consequence different investments. Therefore, it seems pref-
erable to focus, in empirical studies, on homogeneous resources, even if some mechanisms
described in the theoretical literature between point-source resources, Institutions and FDI are
common to oil and minerals. According to the World Bank Development Indicators, oil rents
represented 60% of natural-resource rents at the world level during the period 2003-2012. Due
to its economic relevance, this study focuses on oil.
The aim of this paper is to tackle the relationship between institutional quality and FDI in
oil-abundant countries. This issue has received little attention, with several notable exceptions
that make the issue even more puzzling. Indeed, existing evidence suggests that endowment in
oil, fuels or minerals weakens the positive impact that democracy and institutional quality
have on FDI (e.g. [11, 13]). These findings contrast with the extensive literature that highlights
the relevance of good governance for attracting FDI (e.g. [14, 15]) or that suggests that the nat-
ural-resource curse could be turned into a blessing through institutional improvements (e.g.
[16]).
A specific contribution to the subject of the impact of point-source natural resources on the
institution-FDI nexus is to provide solid empirical evidence in a broader panel setting. Previ-
ous studies have two shortcomings: they usually focus on single countries or a reduced subset
and analyse aggregate FDI inflows, regardless of the bilateral nature of FDI. At the aggregate
level, FDI inflows could influence institutional quality with the subsequent potential endo-
geneity bias. To hedge these limitations, we estimate bilateral greenfield FDI flows for 182
countries during 2003-2012 by means of the gravity equation. Greenfield investment repre-
sents more than half of the world’s FDI projects and 72% of the total FDI projects received by
developing countries. This kind of investment signifies a notable entry of investments and
knowledge for the recipient country. The world’s total number of FDI projects is calculated as
the sum of greenfield investment and merger and acquisitions projects. Shares are calculated
by the authors based on the annex Tables 11 and 22 from [17].
Unlike other studies, we delve into the factors that determine the creation of new invest-
ment links at the country level (extensive margin). This allows us to offer a better understand-
ing of the question of whether there is an oil curse on FDI, and which aspects of good
governance matter most for attracting FDI in oil-producing countries.
Our results suggest that rule of law, lack of corruption, political stability and democracy are
relevant determinants of new greenfield investment projects. Results also validate the hypothe-
sis of an “oil curse” on new investment linkages, but do not support the idea that countries’ oil
production undermines the positive impact of good governance on greenfield investment. In
fact, the benefits from institutional improvements increase with the relevance of oil rents in
the host economy. This finding is confirmed by the robustness analysis which accounts for
omitted variables, causality between FDI, institutions and oil production, and alternative mea-
sures of oil abundance.
Based on this analysis, we illustrate how institutional reforms would affect a country’s
capacity for attracting greenfield FDI for different levels of oil production. Furthermore, we
infer the level of institutional quality that would allow, all else being equal, a country to over-
come the oil curse on FDI.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section details how the abun-
dance of natural resources may interfere in the institution-FDI nexus. Section III describes the
FDI in oil-abundant countries: The role of institutions
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methodology and data used. Section IV presents the results, which are followed by a sensitivity
and robustness analysis in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes.
Theoretical and empirical review
Does the quality of institutions attract FDI?
There are several reasons why the quality of institutions matters for FDI. The economic growth
literature suggests that better institutions may generate more economic growth through better
incentives to invest and more efficient allocation of resources [18]. In addition, high-quality
institutions are also expected to reduce information asymmetries, providing information
about market conditions, goods and participants, which in turn can encourage (domestic and
foreign) investment in the country [19]. In contrast, a “bad” institutional environment may
increase the cost of doing business either by uncertainty brought about by political instability
or corruption and poor compliance to the rule of law.
Even if the widespread conviction is that good governance tends to attract FDI, theoretical
and empirical studies that examine more precise aspects of institutions draw a more ambigu-
ous relationship. Most studies confirm that political risks deter investment from multinational
enterprises (MNEs) for different sets of countries e.g. [14, 15, 20–26] while others find no evi-
dence linking political risks to FDI e.g. [27–30] and [10]. However, [31] and [32] report a dis-
crepant negative relationship between stability and FDI. The expected effects of corruption on
FDI are particularly controversial. At first glance, corruption clearly increases the transactional
costs of foreign firms and thus should deter FDI. This conclusion is validated by several studies
e.g. [9, 10, 20, 21, 24, 33–36] and [37]. Yet, corruption is also seen as the “helping hand”, at
least at the firm level and despite the negative aggregate outcome on growth (see [38–40]).
Indeed, in an institutional framework characterised by inefficient bureaucracy, these illegal
practices may also be a way to circumvent an inefficient administration or influence govern-
ment policies to the benefit of the MNE [36, 41].
FDI and institutions quality in the context of resource-rich countries
When point-source natural resources are at stake, MNEs may be encouraged by lower institu-
tional quality since in this way they are able to appropriate a larger share of its rents and enjoy
greater bargaining power [12, 42]. In this regard, [43] states that countries rich in this type of
natural resources could attract a larger share of FDI by offering cheap access, even if there is a
high expropriation risk. The author suggests that the penalty for host countries’ governments
lessens, as the value of foreign assets in the sector increases and the royalties for exploiting nat-
ural resources paid by MNEs decrease. [13] conclude that MNEs always exhibit institutional
risk aversion, although investment returns in countries with low capital intensities but with
abundance in natural resources may outweigh the costs associated with institutional risk. Nev-
ertheless, MNEs operating in this sector are constrained by the limited availability of the natu-
ral resources, converting this specificity into a pre-condition of their location choice,
regardless of the institutional framework [42, 44].
Along the same lines, [45] show that, for FDI originating from developing countries, the
negative impact of “bad” institutions on FDI inflows is lower when the host country is abun-
dant in point-source natural resources (For a survey of the motivations of FDI from emerging
countries, see for instance [46]). [44, 47] and [13] find similar results for Chinese outward
FDI, explaining that Chinese FDI is not attracted by bad institutions per se but rather by natu-
ral resources that correlate with bad institutions. In a similar vein, [48] report that property
rights do not have a significant impact on FDI directed towards the primary sector.
FDI in oil-abundant countries: The role of institutions
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FDI and the political system in the context of resource-rich countries
Institutions are in turn shaped by the political system, namely, the degree of democracy or
autocracy [49]. Democracies tend to be more predictable and make their preferences clear
[50], thus reducing investment uncertainty. Additionally, democracies may be accompanied
by countries’ openness to the world economy [51]. The lack of democracy boosts social ten-
sions that increase the likelihood of bringing severe political and social crisis to a country [52].
Similarly, [11, 14, 28, 50, 51, 53, 54] and [55] point out a positive relationship between democ-
racy and FDI. In contrast, [31, 38, 56] and [57] evidence a negative relationship, while others
fail to find a significant effect [29, 39, 58] and [59].
Some characteristics of democracies, such as changes of governments and policies, may
be seen as drawbacks for MNEs. More precisely, in countries abundant in natural resources,
autocracies may offer more advantages than disadvantages to those foreign firms interested
in investing in the resource sector for rent-seeking motives. This is mainly due to the fact
that point-source natural resources, and particularly oil, are controlled by local authorities.
[11] suggest that MNEs in the extractive industry wish to avoid frequent changes of govern-
ments, since governments that have long-term stability favour closer ties. Moreover, [38]
argue that when investment seeks to access natural resources, MNEs may prefer slight civil
repression.
The empirical validations of the above hypotheses are scarce. [11] find that democracy has a
positive impact for FDI but the share of mineral and oil in total exports undermines the posi-
tive effect of democracy on FDI. Similarly, [50] find that media freedom has a negative influ-
ence on FDI that outweighs the positive impact of other democratic attributes when both
natural resources, measured by the share of mineral and oil in total exports, and income
inequality are high. [55] report a strong link between democracy and FDI among all industries
except mining and oil and gas extraction.
Can good institutions cancel out the FDI resource curse?
The above reviewed research is linked to the extensive strand of the literature studying the neg-
ative effects of substantial natural-resource endowment on countries’ performance. This para-
doxical phenomenon that may turn the “blessing” of natural resources into a “curse” is also
often referred to as the Dutch disease. Resource discoveries may have a negative effect on
growth since it generates a large increase in exports which in turn leads to an appreciation of
the local currency. This makes the country’s exports less competitive at world prices, and
thereby crowds out investments in non-natural-resource tradable sectors. Productive activities
that boost growth decline in favour of the natural-resource sector for rent-seeking purposes [4,
7]. Natural-resource abundance is also likely to favour bad institutions in detriment of pro-
growth behaviour. The rents provided by the exploitation of natural resources are easily appro-
priated generating a “rentier effect” [3, 6, 12, 45]. Moreover, revenues from the export of fuels
and minerals allow governments to quieten critics and avoid accountability pressures [2]. Nat-
ural-resource abundance breeds corruption [45] and raises expropriation risks [43]. Further-
more, growth collapses due to a high dependence on natural-resource rents and international
price volatility, and domestic struggles for the control of natural resources, can result in social
unrest and violence [5].
However, point-source natural resources do not necessarily imply countries’ low economic
performance. In this regard, Norway is the paradigmatic example. [1, 16] and [60] argue that
good governance could potentially turn the natural-resources curse into a blessing by investing
the capital brought by natural resources into productive activities or promoting knowledge-
intensive economic activities, hence promoting economic growth.
FDI in oil-abundant countries: The role of institutions
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The mechanisms described above may have a direct effect on FDI. Indeed, FDI inflows are
attracted by high expected returns in the resource sector, and decrease in the non-resource sec-
tor. The likelihood of an overall negative effect is high and referred to as a “FDI-resource
curse” [20]. Other indirect effects are also liable to deter FDI. For instance, macroeconomic
instability could increase since the volatility of the exchange rate is expected to rise due to the
booms and busts that characterise natural-resource prices [7] and due to the lower trade diver-
sification makes a country more vulnerable to external shocks. This adverse context may deter
FDI. [11] also argue that FDI in natural resources is expected to stagger after the initial phase
since less capital is needed to continue the exploration that is needed to start it.
Surprisingly, very few studies back this hypothesis. [12] show, for Dutch FDI into 183 host
countries that FDI flows to the natural-resource sector do not compensate for the disinvest-
ments in the non-resource sector. Similar results are reached by [30] for 16 Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) countries and by [61] and [24] for Gulf Cooperation Council countries.
Nonetheless, the majority of studies focusing on small datasets acknowledge that the availabil-
ity of point-source natural resources has a positive and significant effect on FDI in developing
countries. See for instance [62] for 53 African countries, [33] for 22 countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA), [21] for 16 Arab economies, [9] using a panel of 36 developing countries, [25] for
108 autocratic countries and [63] for 22 Sub-Saharan African countries. However, for larger
datasets the evidence is scant and mixed. [45] find a non-significant effect of resources on
bilateral FDI flows (Their dataset includes 60 developing and 22 developed economies). [11]
and [20] conclude that point-source natural resources have an adverse effect on FDI. [11]
study a sample of 112 developing countries and [20] focuses on 99 developing countries. In
contrast, [10], for a sample of 125 developing countries, find that point-source natural
resources foster inward FDI.
[12] address the question of the role of quality institutions as a mediator in the natural
resources-FDI nexus but reject the hypothesis of a significant influence. [20] also confirms that
institutional quality may be able to reduce, but not fully cancel, the effect of natural resources
on FDI. [53] demonstrates that FDI is positively moderated by the accumulation of democratic
capital, and shows that the association between FDI and democracy is not affected by resource
dependence.
Methodology and data overview
Empirical model
Unlike most of the studies reviewed, our empirical model explores the bilateral dimension of
FDI. As demonstrated by [64], traditional gravity variables are better candidates for explaining
FDI activity than merely host-country characteristics. Another decision regards the choice of
the dependent variable. Most studies focus on the amount of FDI flows or FDI stocks, measur-
ing therefore the intensive margin of FDI. Very few are able to measure the extensive margin
of FDI since they work with macro data. Indeed, there are several advantages to working on
the number of projects rather than flows. First, due to the existence of fixed FDI costs, selection
of firms into FDI is limited [65], in analogy with the export behaviour underlined by [66].
Hence, as long as the institutional framework reduces or increases these sunk investing costs,
the quality of institutions is more likely to influence the preliminary decision to develop new
projects of investments [67] than the invested amount. Second, flows are sometimes dependent
on one or two large investment projects, especially in relatively small countries, so relying on
the stocks of FDI may be misleading [34, 68].
Following these arguments, we estimate the effect of several indicators of host-country
institutions on the number of bilateral greenfield investment projects, using a standard gravity
FDI in oil-abundant countries: The role of institutions
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equation. The gravity equation is the workhorse of empirical studies that analyse international
economic flows. The gravity model was first developed to study the determinants of bilateral
trade flows (for an overview see [69] and [70]). This framework offers several advantages,
which have contributed to its popularity in examining trade, capital, migration and tourism
flows. First, the gravity equation for trade has been founded on solid theoretical grounds since
[71] and [72]. Following trade developments, studies such as [73–75] and [76, 77] have devel-
oped theoretical models that result in empirical equations for the case of FDI. Second, empiri-
cal advances in the estimation of the gravity equation have led to estimations that minimize
known biases such as the abundance of zeros and the heteroscedasticity in the error term [78].
Third, the gravity equation delivers a flexible toolkit to estimate our variables of interest while
controlling for both observable and unobservable confounding factors. Most notable is the
inclusion of multilateral resistance terms that control for third country effects.
We are interested in estimating the joint effect of domestic institutions and oil endowments
on greenfield FDI projects. The work of [57], which studies the role of domestic legal rights
and democracy in advanced and developed countries, provides a starting point that we extend
in several ways. Firstly, we frame our study on the economic impact of institutions rather than
on business ethics. [57] were interested in the ethical implications of FDI and in so doing
looked only at the effect of the host development level on the marginal effect of democracy on
FDI. Their golden rule of FDI ethics considered the incentives of becoming democratic in least
developed countries. Therefore, the role of natural-resource endowments, namely oil, was left
out of their framework. Our focus on oil rents is an additional channel proposed by the eco-
nomics literature. Secondly, we extend the institutional variables by adding lack of corruption
and political stability. Thirdly, we perform a battery of robustness checks to support our analy-
sis. To this end, we estimate the following specification:
FDIijt ¼ e
b1lnðGDPitxGDPjtÞ þ b2lnðDistanceijÞ þ b3BORDERij
þb4LANGUAGEij þ b5COLONYij þ b6SMCNTRYij þ b7Religionij
þb8FTAijt þ b9BITijt þ b10Instjt þ b11InstjtxOILPj þ FE
0
B
B
@
1
C
C
A
þ �ijt
ð1Þ
where i, j and t stand respectively for the source, the host country and the year. FDIijt is the
number of greenfield projects undertaken by firms from country i in the host country j, in year
t; GDPit and GDPjt are the GDPs of home and host countries, respectively; Distanceij is the dis-
tance in kilometres between country capitals; BORDERij is a dummy that indicates whether a
pair of countries share a common border; LANGUAGEij takes positive value if both countries
share the same official language; COLONYij is set to one if the two countries have ever had a
colonial link; Religionij is a composite index that measures the religious affinity between coun-
try pairs with values from zero to one; SMCNTRYij indicates if both countries were part of the
same country in the past; FTAijt is a dummy that indicates whether both countries have a free
trade agreement in force; BITijt is a dummy that takes a value of one if the country pair has a
bilateral investment treaty in force. Next, Instjt stands for institutions, OILPj is a dummy that
represents significant oil producers. Lastly, FE stands for the host and home country, and year
fixed effects (respectively, λi, λj, λt) and �ijt represents the stochastic error term. Following [78],
we account for null flows in bilateral FDI data by using a Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likeli-
hood estimator.
Additionally, Eq 1 is modified to address the impact of oil production on FDI and how dif-
ferent levels of oil production alter the FDI-institutions nexus. In particular we replaced Instjt
xOILPj by the share of oil rents over GDP (Oilrentsjt) and interacted the oil measure with insti-
tutional quality. Due to the high correlation between institutional variables (see Table 1),
namely rule of law, lack of corruption, political stability and democracy, they are estimated
separately.
FDI in oil-abundant countries: The role of institutions
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Data overview
Our analysis covers 182 countries during 2003-2012. Since the dataset contains many zeros
(70% of the potential observations are zero), we have followed the proposal of [79] to imple-
ment an efficient gravity dataset. Basically, we consider zeros only those country-pairs with a
track record of investment in some year. Using a panel (with variation across country-pairs
and time) allows us to explore a better identification strategy. Additionally, [80] argue that the
PPML estimator is appropriate for short panel gravity data, such as the one used in this study.
Statistics for the variables used are available in Table 2. The countries included in the sam-
ple are reported in Table A in the S1 Appendix. Data for bilateral greenfield investments are
gathered from FDI Markets. GDP (in constant year 2000 USD) is retrieved from the World
Bank. Distance, common language, colony, and border are from the CEPII dataset and reli-
gious affinity is obtained from the CIA World Factbook. BIT variable is constructed based on
UNCTAD’s International Investment Agreements database and FTA comes from [81].
Table 1. Correlation matrix.
Greenfield Investment projects Oil rents Rule of law Lack of corruption Political stability
Oil rents -0.119��� 1
Rule of law 0.278��� -0.271��� 1
Lack of corruption 0.242��� -0.277��� 0.953��� 1
Political stability 0.095��� -0.149��� 0.785��� 0.757��� 1
Democracy 0.118��� -0.549��� 0.464��� 0.434��� 0.288���
Note: Authors’ own calculation.
� p < 0.10,
�� p < 0.05,
��� p< 0.01
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215650.t001
Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
FDI 1.77 8.26 0 319
ln(GDPitxGDPjt) 27.09 1.51 20.12 30.40
ln(Distance) 8.31 1.00 4.09 9.88
BORDER 0.06 0.24 0 1
LANGUAGE 0.16 0.37 0 1
COLONY 0.05 0.21 0 1
SMCNTRY 0.02 0.14 0 1
Religion 0.33 0.32 0 1
FTA 0.26 0.44 0 1
BIT 0.42 0.49 0 1
OILP 0.20 0.40 0 1
OilRents 5.67 13.61 0 343.74
Ruleoflaw 3.85 1.01 1.71 5.67
Lackofcorruption 3.12 1.06 1.11 5.48
Politicalstability 4.28 0.94 1.14 5.99
Democracy 14.64 6.50 0 20
Note: authors’ own calculations.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215650.t002
FDI in oil-abundant countries: The role of institutions
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To measure institutional quality, we consider three different indices: rule of law, lack of cor-
ruption and political stability from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators. The
choice of the source of these indicators is based on their wide country coverage and use in pre-
vious works (e.g. [44, 45, 67, 82]). These variables range approximately from -2.5 to +2.5 [83].
To facilitate interpretation in the econometric analysis, we convert them into non-negative val-
ues equal or larger than 1. Higher values suggest respectively better rule of law, less corruption
and a more stable political environment.
Regarding countries’ political systems, we use the Polity2 index from the Polity IV dataset
retrieved from Systemic Peace [84]. The Polity2 index, which we name Democracy, ranges
from -10 (full autocracy) to 10 (full democracy). Again, for the econometric analysis this vari-
able is re-scaled so that it takes values between 0 and 20, 0 representing a full autocracy, and 20
a full democracy.
Democracy and autocracy are measured independently without sharing categories in com-
mon. The degree of both are based on how a country scores in: competitiveness of executive
recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, constraint on chief executives and competi-
tiveness of political participation. Nevertheless, the items that define these variables are differ-
ent. For instance, when measuring the openness of executive recruitment, a democratic
country will score one point if elections are held, or one point as autocracy if chief executives
are determined by hereditary succession. The Polity2 score is computed by subtracting the
score obtained by the index autocracy score from the democracy score. In this way, the Polity2
index enables us to take into account intermediate situations between full autocracy and
democracy. For instance, according to the classification used by Systemic Peace, Saudi Arabia
is an autocracy, Egypt is a closed anocracy, Algeria is an open anocracy, Lebanon a democracy
and Israel a full democracy [84]. We consider this measure as appropriate since it is based on
objective information and because the political system of a country is not a one-dimensional
characteristic, but probably includes several dimensions [38]. Moreover, the Polity2 index has
been extensively used in the literature e.g. [11, 31, 53].
To identify the countries in which oil production represents a significant share of domestic
economy, we use the indicator named Oil Rents from the World Bank. It represents the differ-
ence between the value of crude oil production at world prices and total costs of production
over GDP. We consider oil production as relevant for a country when Oil Rents represent at
least 7.65% of the country’s GDP in at least one year; this threshold stands for the top quintile
of countries in our sample. In this way, our sample is divided into countries in which oil pro-
duction does have a relevant role throughout our period, and those in which its relevance is
anecdotic and limited.
Results
The FDI-institutions nexus
Results from our baseline model are reported in Table 3. As usual in the literature, the gravity
equation performs well, explaining more than 80% of the variation of the dependent variables.
The results for distance and FTA support the hypothesis of complementarity between trade
and FDI. In addition, the lack of significance of the combined home and host countries’ eco-
nomic sizes indicates that greenfield investment projects are driven by fragmentation of pro-
duction. The factor-proportion theory predicts the host country’s demand to increase the
likelihood of production fragmentation, while for the home countries the opposite is expected
[74]. Likewise, sharing a common border deters FDI, implying that MNEs may prefer to serve
neighbour countries through exports. As expected, sharing a language, religious affinities and
historical ties have a positive impact on the number of greenfield projects consistent with a
FDI in oil-abundant countries: The role of institutions
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reduction of sunk costs. Finally, BIT lacks significance. This finding is not surprising, as previ-
ous studies indicate that the significance of BIT depends on the quality of interstate relations
and host countries’ institutional quality [85], the level of development of signing countries
[86], intensity of bilateral FDI flows [87] or the sector of investment [36].
Concerning the impact of institutions on the number of greenfield investment projects,
Instjt and InstjtxOILPj respectively distinguish between non-significant oil producers and sig-
nificant oil producers. For both groups of countries, rule of law does not play a relevant role in
explaining the capacity to attract greenfield investment. Similar to the case of rule of law, the
lack of corruption in non-oil producers is not significant. On the other hand, for countries
that are significant oil producers, reducing corruption would increase a country’s probability
of receiving FDI. This last finding supports the “grabbing hand” hypothesis and is in contrast
to the findings from [38] and [40], who find a positive relationship between the level of corrup-
tion and inward FDI. In addition, this result echoes those from [67], which show that the level
of corruption reduces a country’s probability of receiving FDI, or the results of [41], who find
that corruption affects new entrants in a more obvious negative way than incumbent ones.
Table 3. The FDI-institution nexus.
FDI Rule of law Lack of corruption Political stability Democracy
Extensive margin (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(GDPitxGDPjt) -0.078 -0.075 -0.030 -0.084
(0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18)
ln(Distanceij) -0.389��� -0.389��� -0.388��� -0.390���
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
BORDERij -0.135� -0.135� -0.135� -0.128
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
LANGUAGEij 0.508��� 0.508��� 0.508��� 0.502���
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
COLONYij 0.596��� 0.595��� 0.595��� 0.586���
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
SMCNTRYij 0.566��� 0.566��� 0.566��� 0.568���
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16)
Religionij 0.389��� 0.388��� 0.389��� 0.409���
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
FTAijt 0.195��� 0.193��� 0.196��� 0.187���
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
BITijt -0.028 -0.029 -0.027 -0.030
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Instjt 0.112 -0.053 0.309��� 0.014�
(0.15) (0.09) (0.06) (0.01)
InstjtxOILPj 0.232 0.420��� -0.198� 0.044�
(0.25) (0.15) (0.10) (0.02)
Fixed effects Home, host and year fixed effects
Observations 39151 39151 39118 37153
R2 0.844 0.845 0.847 0.845
Robust standard errors in parentheses
� p < 0.10,
�� p < 0.05,
��� p< 0.01
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215650.t003
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Political stability appears to be crucial to increase the number of foreign projects for both
group of countries. Political instability, that is, politically motivated violence and terrorism,
might not be easily compensated for by countries’ oil endowment. Nevertheless, the overall
positive effect of stability on greenfield investment is lower for countries that are significant oil
producers. As these natural resources are concentrated only in a few countries, this lower
impact might support the view of a higher tolerance by MNEs to instability [13, 42, 44, 47].
Overall, the degree of democracy enhances countries’ capacity to attract new projects. In
addition, the impact of democracy is larger for oil producers than for other countries, as in
[50], but in contrast to [11].
Yet, unlike most studies focusing on aggregate FDI, we explain bilateral projects. This
enables us to control for country pair characteristics such as cultural and geographical and eco-
nomic distance. These differences might explain part of the divergence with some of the find-
ings reported by previous studies that use unilateral FDI flows (e.g. [31, 38, 40]) and the few
studies using bilateral data for FDI to study the nexus between institutions and FDI intensive
margin, which usually find a less significant effect [22, 57, 64], or a positive effect of the quality
of institutions when they focus on a smaller country sample e.g. [39, 88, 89] and [15].
Oil production and institutions
In this section, we further inquire into the role of natural resources in the Institution-FDI rela-
tionship. As we have already mentioned, Table 3 reports the average expected impact of insti-
tutions for significant oil producers However, the dummy which represent significant oil
producers (OILPj) might also capture the potential effect of oil endowment on FDI. We now
look into how different levels of oil production affect FDI and alter the FDI-Institutions nexus.
Table 4 shows the impact of oil rents over GDP (OilRentsjt) on FDI, the expected impact of
institutions (Instjt) and the impact of the combined effect of institutions and oil rents (Oil-
RentsjtxInstjt), which respectively have associated coefficients β10, β11 and β12.
Is there an FDI-resource curse?. Results support the hypothesis of an “oil curse” on FDI’s
extensive margin: that is, the higher the oil production, the lower the number of greenfield
Table 4. Institutions and oil rents over GDP.
FDI Rule of law Lack of corruption Political stability Democracy
Extensive margin (1) (2) (3) (4)
OilRentsjt -0.056��� -0.042��� -0.019� -0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Instjt 0.116 -0.038 0.243��� 0.022���
(0.13) (0.08) (0.06) (0.01)
OilRentsjtxInstjt 0.017��� 0.016��� 0.005�� 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Fixed effects Home, host and year fixed effects
Control variables YES YES YES YES
Observations 36037 36037 36004 34920
R2 0.846 0.846 0.848 0.847
Robust standard errors in parentheses
� p < 0.10,
�� p < 0.05,
��� p < 0.01
Coefficients of control variables are available on request.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215650.t004
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investment projects. Again, our results are in line with those of [11, 20] and [12], who claim
the existence of an oil curse on the capacity of attracting FDI. According to the estimates, one
percentage point increase in the share of oil rents over GDP can reduce the number of projects
by nearly 3% on average (Table 4).
Does the presence of oil undermine the effect of institutions on FDI?. The effect of
institutions (i.e. b^11), regardless of the level of production is not clear-cut. Only political stabil-
ity and democracy would improve the extensive margin while rule of law and lack of corrup-
tion have no effect. Alternatively, we register positive and significant coefficients for Instjt
xOilRentsjt (b^12), indicating that the importance of natural resources magnifies the impact of
institutions on FDI. The exception is the coefficient associated with DemocracyjtxOilRentsjt,
which is null and non-significant. Thus, these results confirm again that institutions would, on
average, have a positive impact for countries that are significant oil producers. In addition,
they show that the gains to be obtained from improvements in institutional quality, and to a
lesser extent democracy, are exacerbated (and not undermined) by countries’ oil production.
These results contradict those of [11] who acknowledge that the relationship between FDI
and democracy depends negatively on the “size” of natural resources measured by the share of
fuel and minerals in total merchandise exports. However, the results are in line with [20] for
institutional quality.
How large are the benefits to be obtained from better institutions?. As in [11], we assess
the magnitude of the benefits, in terms of new greenfield investments, that could be expected
from an improvement in institutions. Based on the estimates reported in Table 4, we calculate
the percentage change in the number of greenfield projects as a consequence of a one-point
change in the institutional indicator (Inst) given the average level of oil production (OilRents):
@lnðFDIÞ
@Inst
¼ b^11 þ b^12Oil ð2Þ
where (Oil) is the average level of oil rents over GDP during the period 2003-2012. Although
the estimated equation is a non-linear, its interpretation is equivalent to a log-linearized equa-
tion [78].
Table 5 illustrates the expected average change in the number of greenfield projects for
countries belonging to different percentiles according to their share of oil rents over GDP. Oil
producers belonging to the top percentiles in terms of Oil rents would greatly benefit from
improving rule of law and reducing corruption. For a country like Azerbaijan, a one-point
improvement in the rule of law and lack of corruption indices would augment the number of
Table 5. Impact of institutional reform given the level of oil rents over GDP.
Percentile of Oil rents Oil rents As in Rule of law Lack of corruption Political stability
10 0.01% Jordan 11.62% -3.78% 24.31%
25 0.17% Philippines 11.90% -3.52% 24.39%
50 1.35% Myanmar (Burma) 13.90% -1.63% 24.98%
75 7.07% Suriname 23.61% 7.50% 27.83%
90 22.27% Syria 49.46% 31.83% 35.43%
95 31.43% Azerbaijan 65.04% 46.49% 40.02%
100 45.86% Saudi Arabia 89.56% 69.58% 47.23%
Average 8.74% Papua New Guinea 26.46% 10.18% 28.67%
Note: Authors’ own calculations, based on estimates from Table 4 and the average level of oil rents over GDP during the period 2003-2012 for those countries in which
oil rents are higher than 0%.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215650.t005
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greenfield projects by 65% and 46% respectively. This would mean rallying to a level similar to
that registered by Croatia. However, the gains from reducing corruption are not clear for all
countries. For those countries in which oil rents are below the sample’s median (1.35%), reduc-
ing corruption can deter new greenfield projects. The gains to be obtained from advancement
towards political stability are also substantial while lower than for the above-mentioned indica-
tors. For a country that does not produce oil (e.g. Paraguay), a progress of one point would
translate into an increment of 24% in the number of projects, and similar gains are expected
for those countries close to the sample’s median. Alternatively, for a country like Syria, the
gains would be of 35%.
Can institutional improvements and democratization cancel out the oil curse on
FDI?. Yes, ceteris paribus, even if oil production overall hampers FDI, these barriers could be
overcome through institutional reforms. As in [20], we calculate the average level of institu-
tional quality and democratization necessary to cancel out the oil curse on FDI. This threshold
is computed as follows:
@lnðFDIÞ
@oil
¼ b^10 þ b^12Instthreshold ¼ 0; Inst threshold ¼  
b^10
b^12
ð3Þ
The results are reported in Table 6, where examples are also provided. The institutional
improvements required to cancel out the negative impact oil dependence has on FDI would
imply attaining levels of other developing countries such as the Republic of Macedonia, Geor-
gia or China. The progress required is attainable; for countries like Algeria, Nigeria and Russia
an increase inferior to one point in the indices would be sufficient to ensure that oil depen-
dence does not hamper FDI. In addition, based on the estimates from Table 4, these institu-
tional reforms could boost new greenfield projects in Algeria, Nigeria and Russia by 14.32%,
23.88% and 15.56%, respectively.
Robustness and sensitivity analysis
In the following lines, we perform a battery of robustness checks to support our analysis.
Table 3 may suffer from an omitted variable bias since we do not control for the pure effect
that oil abundance may have on FDI. Then, the robustness and sensitivity analysis focus on the
specification from Table 4. To conserve space, we only comment on the key estimates, namely
the coefficients associated to oil production and institutional quality.
Table 6. Institutional quality and democracy levels required to counterbalance the oil curse on FDI.
Level required to cancel out the
oil curse
As in Country with lower institutional
quality
Improvement in institution required to cancel out
the oil curse
Rule of law 3.29 Republic of
Macedonia
Algeria 0.32
Lack of
corruption
2.63 Georgia Nigeria 0.80
Political
stability
3.80 China Russia 0.49
Note: Authors’ own calculations, based on estimates from Table 4 and the average level of institutions of countries during the period 2003-2012. As in the econometric
analysis, institutional variables are converted in a way that they equal or are larger than 1.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215650.t006
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Alternative measures of oil abundance
We test the sensitivity of our results to different measures of oil production. Following [11, 20]
and [9], we consider the share of fuel and minerals in merchandise exports (FuelExportsjt) as
an alternative measure of oil abundance. In addition, we also test whether the previous find-
ings hold when considering countries’ share of World oil production (OilSharejt) or the abso-
lute number of oil-barrels production (OilBarrelsjt). The share of fuels and minerals in
merchandise exports are retrieved from World Bank’s Development Indicators, and the num-
ber of oil barrels production from Thomson Reuters Eikon. Estimates are respectively available
in Tables 7, 8 and 9. Our conclusions remain basically unchanged. They validate the oil curse
Table 7. Institutions and share of fuel in merchandise exports, extensive margin.
FDI Rule of law Lack of corruption Political stability Democracy
Extensive margin (1) (2) (3) (4)
FuelExportsjt -0.041��� -0.015�� 0.017� -0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Instjt -0.079 -0.120 0.248��� 0.005
(0.14) (0.08) (0.06) (0.01)
InstjtxFuelExportsjt 0.015��� 0.010��� -0.001 0.001���
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Fixed effects Home, host and year fixed effects
Control variables YES YES YES YES
Observations 35851 35851 35851 34223
R2 0.852 0.852 0.851 0.851
Robust standard errors in parentheses
� p < 0.10,
�� p < 0.05,
��� p < 0.01
Coefficients of control variables are available on request.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215650.t007
Table 8. Institutions and oil barrels production share of world’s output.
FDI Rule of law Lack of corruption Political stability Democracy
Extensive margin (1) (2) (3) (4)
OilSharejt -0.722��� -0.143�� -0.218�� -0.274���
(0.13) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06)
Instjt -0.01 -0.094 0.180��� -0.002
(0.13) (0.09) (0.05) (0.01)
OilSharejtxInstjt 0.147��� 0.037��� 0.037�� 0.018���
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00)
Fixed effects Home, host and year fixed effects
Control variables YES YES YES YES
Observations 35632 35878 35877 34017
R2 0.846 0.847 0.850 0.850
Robust standard errors in parentheses
� p < 0.10,
�� p < 0.05,
��� p< 0.01
Coefficients of control variables are available on request.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215650.t008
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on greenfield investment projects, and show that the positive effect of institutional quality is
enhanced by the level of oil abundance. Furthermore, the interaction of the natural resource
measure and democracy becomes positive and significant.
Greenfield investment volume
The first robustness check tests whether the findings reached for the extensive margin are also
extendable to the intensive margin. Thus, the dependent variable (number of greenfield invest-
ment projects) in Eq 1 is substituted by the total investment volume. Table 10 illustrates that
only democracy appears to have a positive significant impact, while the remaining indicators
and all the interactions are not significant. Furthermore, we do not find evidence supporting
the hypothesis that oil production affects the amount of greenfield investments.
Unobserved and omitted variables
Country pair fixed effects. The second robustness check consists of testing whether the
estimated models suffer from omitted variables in terms of the time-invariant transaction
costs between pair of countries. To this end, in Eq 1, we substitute the bilateral time invariant
variables and the source and host countries fixed effects by country pair fixed effects (λij). Esti-
mates for the extensive and intensive margin are available in Table 11. As can be seen, in both
margins, the significance, sign and size of the coefficients remain unchanged.
Migration stock. Recent literature has stressed the influence of migration on FDI and par-
ticularly on greenfield FDI [76, 77]. The diaspora of MENA country migrants in particular,
and oil-producing countries in general, is non-negligible, and therefore might be a source of
omitted variable bias. To test for this, we have introduced the bilateral stock of migrants (taken
from the OECD migration database) in our regressions. The data of migrants restricts the
source countries to OECD countries. However, the results reported in Table 12 confirm the
robustness of our results considering both out of sample validity and omitted variable bias in
relation to migrant stocks.
Table 9. Institutions and oil barrels, extensive margin.
FDI Rule of law Lack of corruption Political stability Democracy
Extensive margin (1) (2) (3) (4)
OilBarrelsjt -0.916��� -0.234��� -0.395��� -0.404���
(0.17) (0.08) (0.13) (0.09)
Instjt -0.019 -0.116 0.163��� -0.003
(0.14) (0.10) (0.05) (0.01)
InstjtxOilBarrelsjt 0.190��� 0.062��� 0.065��� 0.027���
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Fixed effects Home, host and year fixed effects
Control variables YES YES YES YES
Observations 35877 35878 35878 34017
R2 0.848 0.847 0.850 0.851
Robust standard errors in parentheses
� p < 0.10,
�� p < 0.05,
��� p < 0.01
Coefficients of control variables are available on request.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215650.t009
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Endogeneity issues
The fourth robustness check deals with the potential endogeneity between inward FDI and
countries’ institutional quality and oil production. For instance, [90] suggest that total FDI can
influence countries’ institutional quality or degree of democracy. Similarly, by providing the
necessary capital and technology, MNEs can facilitate countries’ oil production (e.g. [1, 12]).
In this regard, it is important to highlight three relevant aspects of the present analysis. First,
the endogeneity issue between institutional quality and FDI is a lesser concern when explain-
ing bilateral investment projects. Contrary to the case of total inward FDI, the investments
from only one country are less likely to affect the host countries’ institutional framework (see
[91]). Second, during our period of analysis, only 1.8% of the world’s greenfield investment
projects reached the mining, quarrying and petroleum sector (Shares are calculated by the
authors based on the annex Table 23 from [17]). Third, oil rents are the difference between the
Table 10. Institutions and oil rents over GDP, intensive margin.
FDI Rule of law Lack of corruption Political stability Democracy
Intensive margin (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(GDPitxGDPjt) -0.023 0.015 -0.047 -0.048
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
ln(Distanceij) -0.390��� -0.389��� -0.388��� -0.387���
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
BORDERij -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
LANGUAGEij 0.481��� 0.481��� 0.481��� 0.479���
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
COLONYij 0.461��� 0.462��� 0.462��� 0.459���
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
SMCNTRYij 0.398 0.399 0.399 0.384
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26)
Religionij 0.836��� 0.837��� 0.837��� 0.834���
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24)
FTAijt 0.160 0.164 0.165 0.168
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
BITijt -0.102 -0.103 -0.101 -0.095
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
OilRentsjt -0.012 -0.036 0.017 0.029
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Instjt -0.259 -0.214 0.095 0.050��
(0.26) (0.18) (0.11) (0.02)
InstjtxOilRentsjt 0.010 0.024 -0.000 -0.000
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Fixed effects Home, host and year fixed effects
Control variables YES YES YES YES
Observations 36037 36037 36004 34920
R2 0.434 0.434 0.433 0.435
Robust standard errors in parentheses
� p < 0.10,
�� p < 0.05,
��� p< 0.01
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215650.t010
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value of crude oil production and total costs of production. Consequently, oil rents do not
account for rents obtained by extraction companies [12]. Nevertheless, countries’ quality of
governance or level of oil production might not be fully exogenous to bilateral FDI.
To address whether this potential endogeneity bias affects the baseline results, we estimate
two alternative specifications of Eq 1. First, following [42] and [12], we lag in one period the
Table 11. Institutions and oil rents over GDP with country pair fixed effects.
Rule of law Lack of corruption Political stability Democracy
FDIp FDIv FDIp FDIv FDIp FDIv FDIp FDIv
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OilRentsjt -0.056��� -0.014 -0.042��� -0.038 -0.019� 0.019 -0.000 0.032
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Instjt 0.109 -0.209 -0.038 -0.196 0.244��� 0.091 0.024��� 0.061��
(0.13) (0.26) (0.08) (0.18) (0.06) (0.11) (0.01) (0.02)
InstjtxOilRentsjt 0.017��� 0.010 0.016��� 0.025� 0.005�� -0.001 -0.000 -0.002
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Fixed effects Country pair and year fixed effects
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 36016 36016 36016 36016 36010 36010 34819 34819
R2 0.901 0.719 0.901 0.720 0.901 0.719 0.905 0.726
Robust standard errors in parentheses
� p < 0.10,
�� p < 0.05,
��� p< 0.01
FDIp is the extensive margin and FDIv is the intensive margin. Coefficients of control variables are available on request.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215650.t011
Table 12. Institutions and oil rents over GDP with bilateral migration.
Rule of law Lack of corruption Political stability Democracy
FDIp FDIv FDIp FDIv FDIp FDIv FDIp FDIv
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Migrationji -0.020 0.033 -0.019 0.038 -0.020 0.035 -0.028 0.010
(0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.10)
OilRentsjt -0.041�� -0.048 -0.041��� -0.069 -0.056��� -0.038 -0.020�� 0.041
(0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Instjt 0.173 0.134 0.035 -0.087 0.207��� 0.194 0.016� 0.039
(0.17) (0.36) (0.11) (0.24) (0.08) (0.14) (0.01) (0.02)
InstjtxOilRentsjt 0.008 0.028 0.011� 0.046�� 0.011�� 0.023�� 0.001 0.001
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Fixed effects Country pair and year fixed effects
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12146 12146 12146 12146 12146 12146 11717 11717
R2 0.937 0.781 0.937 0.781 0.937 0.781 0.939 0.785
Robust standard errors in parentheses
� p < 0.10,
�� p < 0.05,
��� p< 0.01
FDIp is the extensive margin and FDIv is the intensive margin. Coefficients of control variables are available on request.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215650.t012
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independent variables that refer to institutions and oil production. Results of the extensive and
intensive margin are reported in Table 13. Estimates of the extensive margin corroborate that
the benefits from improving institutional quality and the level of democracy is enhanced by
the level of oil production. Similarly, the results of the intensive margin are identical to those
reported in Table 10.
The second specification replicates that of [11] but applied to bilateral FDI as in [92]. We
estimate a linear dynamic panel data model with the system Generalised Method of Moments
(GMM) proposed by [93]. In this way, Eq 1 includes as independent variable the lagged FDI,
and bilateral time-invariant variables are replaced with country pair fixed effects. We use the
two-step system GMM estimator, and specify oil production (OilRentsjt) and institutions
(Instjt) variables as endogenous, while the remaining independent variables are considered as
strictly exogenous. In line with [11], our estimations use the lagged levels of all the indepen-
dent variables as instruments. Therefore, the system GMM estimator also deals with the endo-
geneity of other potential problematic independent variables [94].
Estimates are presented in Table 14. In both margins, the lagged value of FDI is positive as
expected but with low values since FDI exhibits a less persistent behaviour than trade. As it can
be gathered, evidence of a oil resource curse on FDI is reached for both margins. Furthermore,
on the extensive margin, the results ratify that the benefits of improving rule of law and reduc-
ing corruption are magnified by oil endowment. Similar conclusions are reached on the inten-
sive margin for rule of law, lack of corruption and political stability.
Conclusions
The present article, by estimating a gravity equation, addresses how oil abundance, institutions
and the interaction between both affects countries’ capacity to foster greenfield investment. To
this end, we exploit a greenfield investment bilateral database which covers 182 countries dur-
ing the period 2003-2012. We use alternative measures of oil production to take into account
the dependence of the host on oil production and the dependence of the world on the host’s
Table 13. Institutions and oil rents over GDP with lagged variables.
Rule of law Lack of corruption Political stability Democracy
FDIp FDIv FDIp FDIv FDIp FDIv FDIp FDIv
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OilRentsjt−1 -0.039��� -0.000 -0.047��� -0.018 -0.028��� -0.015 0.010� 0.014
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Instjt−1 0.129 -0.039 -0.156� -0.347 0.268��� 0.207� 0.008 0.045�
(0.13) (0.25) (0.09) (0.24) (0.06) (0.11) (0.01) (0.02)
InstjtxOilRentsjt−1 0.015��� 0.001 0.022��� 0.008 0.009��� 0.004 -0.000 -0.001
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Fixed effects Home, host and year fixed effects
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 29912 29912 29912 29912 29843 29843 29046 29046
R2 0.853 0.425 0.854 0.424 0.860 0.429 0.854 0.427
Robust standard errors in parentheses
� p < 0.10,
�� p < 0.05,
��� p< 0.01
FDIp is the extensive margin and FDIv is the intensive margin. Coefficients of control variables are available on request.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215650.t013
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production. Moreover, we tackle institutions in a broad manner by considering rule of law,
corruption, political stability and democracy.
According to our results, institutional quality and democracy appear to be a crucial dimen-
sion in defining significant oil-producing countries’ capacity for attracting new greenfield
projects. Regarding a possible “oil curse” on FDI, our results confirm that overall, oil-abundant
countries attract fewer greenfield projects than others. In addition, the evidence obtained sug-
gests that countries with better governance and more democracy would attract more greenfield
investments, with this effect being larger for countries highly dependent on oil and for main
players in the world oil market. Thus, for oil producers, institutional reforms can significantly
improve their capacity for attracting new investment partners. These reforms may raise the
opportunity to diversify their economy and reduce the likelihood of suffering from the oil
curse on FDI.
Our conjecture for this apparently puzzling result is that, when national production is
heavily dependent on oil, the government might well be heavily dependent on these resources
but may lack the capital to exploit these resources, which makes governments more willing to
attract foreign projects. For these countries with high economic dependence on oil but with
the lack of capital to exploit it, institutional reforms are likely to increase their capacity to
attract foreign capital. When the host-country production represents a significant share of the
world’s output, the host government is empowered, allowing it to sustain closed-economy pol-
icies combined with rent-seeking behaviour by the domestic oligarchy and does not need for-
eign investors. [30] argue that countries with large reserves of oil and gas have enough
financial resources and foreign currency available to finance their own economic develop-
ment. They may prefer to contract expertise services rather than incentivise FDI. Oil-rich
countries have typically not actively encouraged FDI and have stipulated local ownership
requirements in many, if not all, industry sectors [95]. In this way, similar to the conclusions
reached by [23] for the MENA region or [51] in the analysis of democracy, the overall
improvement of institutional quality and democracy favours countries’ integration into the
Table 14. Institutions and oil rents over GDP: System GMM estimate.
Rule of law Lack of corruption Political stability Democracy
FDIp FDIv FDIp FDIv FDIp FDIv FDIp FDIv
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FDIijt−1 0.093��� 0.059��� 0.084��� 0.061��� 0.091��� 0.060��� 0.090��� 0.062���
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
OilRentsjt -0.001 -0.011�� -0.005��� -0.034��� 0.000 -0.010�� -0.002 0.004
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Instjt 0.055��� 0.157��� 0.006 -0.010 0.077��� 0.192��� -0.001 0.025��
(0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.00) (0.01)
InsjttxOilRentsjt 0.000 0.003� 0.003��� 0.015��� 0.000 0.002�� 0.000�� -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Fixed effects Country pair and year fixed effects
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 32580 32580 32580 32580 32558 32558 31523 31523
Robust standard errors in parentheses
� p < 0.10,
�� p < 0.05,
��� p < 0.01
FDIp is the extensive margin and FDIv is the intensive margin. Coefficients of control variables are available on request.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215650.t014
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world economy. For those countries that enjoy an oligopolistic position in oil production, sig-
nificant institutional reforms would imply withdrawing these barriers to FDI.
Our study offers also an interesting evidence-based policy implication for countries
approaching FDI promotion. The specialized literature interprets a growth in the extensive
margin as the effect of FDI creation through new investment partners. We find a robust nega-
tive effect of the oil variables on the extensive margin. This effect, however, is not so robust on
the intensive margin (value of flows). These findings suggest that, while oil-abundant countries
attract fewer investment projects than similar countries without oil, the total value of invest-
ment remains relatively unchanged. This result is compatible with a scenario where investment
is highly concentrated on a group of countries in a particular sector, with a high dependency
on foreign technology to exploit oil rents. This limits the policy-maker’s options to confront
an economic downturn or technological disruption in their niche countries and sector. How-
ever, new research in this area is needed to further study this issue—for example, the effect of
the progressive decarbonisation of advanced economies on potential investors.
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